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LAGGING COLOSSUS OR A MATURE CYBER-ALLIANCE? 
20 Years of Cyber Defence in NATO 
ZAOSTÁVAJÍCÍ KOLOS ANEBO VYZRÁLÁ KYBERNETICKÁ ALIANCE? 
20 let kybernetické obrany v NATO 
Tomáš Maďara 
Abstrakt 
Článek představuje současné NATO jako uvědomělou a sebevědomou organizaci, která 
postupuje na cestě k zabezpečení kybernetické bezpečnosti celé Aliance. Zdůrazněna je 
teze, že přestože v první dekádě po válce v Kosovu byla problematika kybernetické 
obrany v rámci Aliance upozaděna, v návaznosti na útoky na Estonsko v roce 2007 a jejich 
analýzu post mortem dokázala Aliance definovat priority pro tuto oblast a v posledních 
deseti letech mílovými kroky deficit dohnala. Jako nejdůležitější jsou identifikovány 
summity z let 2014, 2016 a 2018 a jejich přínos.  
Abstract 
The article presents NATO as a self-aware and confident organisation that takes measured 
steps to enhance the cyber security of the Alliance as a whole. I reassert the notion that 
in spite of cyber defence not featuring on the top of the agenda in the early 2000s due to 
the effects of 9/11, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 2004 NATO 
enlargement process, after the 2007 attacks on Estonia and their post-mortem analysis 
the Alliance has been able to define priorities for this particular area and to significantly 
decrease the deficit by taking substantial but measured steps to rectify the situation it 
found itself in. The summits of 2014, 2016 and 2018 are identified as the most important 
in terms of NATO’s development in this area. 
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Feedback loops designed to help solve the air defence problem during the 1940s, the 
endeavour directed at decrypting the infamous Enigma cipher machines during the very 
same timeframe, later on the Global Positioning System and packet switching networks, 
to name a few – much of the development in fields such as cybernetics, cryptography, 
computer science and information technology had historically been closely rooted 
in or linked to their potential or real application in warfare.1 Even the ubiquitous 
Internet, quite possibly the very symbol of the information revolution for the average 
citizen, is a direct descendant of ARPANET, a packet switching network originally funded 
by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the United States Department 
of Defense. 
The military application of the many innovations based in computer science and 
information technology had matured throughout the second half of the 20th century. 
This process culminated in January 1991, as Operation Desert Storm began. The First Gulf 
War was the first embodiment of information era conflict in which coalition forces led by 
the United States attained information dominance, significantly outperformed Iraqi forces 
and quickly forced a surrender whilst sustaining minimal losses themselves. 
The coalition forces’ efficacy was further bolstered by the U.S. intelligence having 
exploited Iraqi systems and networks in the run-up to the Desert Storm breaking out via 
computer network operations. Through computer network exploitation of Iraqi command-
and-control systems, the U.S. military gained precise insights into the status of Iraqi 
forces. As the fighting broke out, by having disabled Saddam Hussein’s fibre-optics 
communication links by bombing the switching systems pinpointed by European companies 
which installed them, the coalition forces made the adversary reroute communications to 
a back-up system built on microwave signals which could then be exploited by satellite 
means.2 
Though kinetic weapons were favoured over computer network attack capabilities, 
Operation Desert Storm marks the first campaign where cyber means were utilized 
effectively as a force multiplier. 
In 1994, the Clinton administration contemplated an invasion onto Haiti, after a UN 
Security Council resolution called for restoration of rule of the democratically elected 
president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was ousted in a coup d’état. Even though the 
situation was eventually resolved after the perpetrators fled the island, a U.S. military 
plan for onslaught involved disabling the Haitian air-defence system that was hooked up 
to local telephone lines by a denial-of-service type computer network attack.3 
Seeking lessons to be learned from the conflict and its consequences, U.S. analysts soon 
realized that the very technology on which Western democracies were becoming more 
and more reliant would also be used by adversarial forces in future conflicts against the 
West. NATO, however, only understood this challenge after it was already too late. 
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The Kosovo war of 1999, dubbed “Web War I” or “The First Internet War” first laid bare 
in full the potential vulnerabilities of NATO networks. While most of the exchange within 
the conflict consisted of information competition and propaganda, patriotic hackers 
based in Serbia, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania and even China4 engaged in cyber attacks, and 
in some cases managed to degrade networks of NATO and the U.S. military. A successful 
distributed denial-of-service attack even resulted in bringing down the official NATO 
website, prompting a public apology by then-NATO spokesman, Jamie Shea.5 
The experience of Operation Allied Force clearly demonstrated the growing reliance on 
information technology in both operations and strategic communications and public 
relations. With the recognition of these vulnerabilities coinciding with the adoption of 
the revolutionary 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, how quickly did NATO get up to speed to 
be able to face threats emanating from cyberspace? 
AIMS AND METHODOLOGY 
Twenty years after the first baby steps were taken by NATO, where exactly does the 
organization find itself with regard to its cyber preparedness and how does it lay the 
groundwork and fulfil its role-model part for the Allied nations? Which summits were the 
most instrumental in that their decisions were key to establishing NATO’s current 
strategic cyber defence posture? 
Even after the big leaps taken at both the 2014 Wales Summit and 2016 Warsaw Summit, 
there were voices that still echoed the notion that NATO’s build-up in capabilities and 
development of policies remains limited and slow. Not just NATO, but the Alliance6 has 
been seen by some as not wholly living up to its potential in addressing the cyber threats 
and risks of the 21st century. Some of the oft-stressed areas included the Alliance’s 
supposed indecisiveness, inability or unwillingness to adopt offensive cyber capabilities 
or undertake offensive computer network operations, lack of doctrine and strategic 
objectives and vast differences in levels of defence capability and preparedness across 
respective NATO Member States.7 
Utilizing the research design of a retrospective longitudinal case study, the article 
presents an overview and analysis of NATO’s development of policies, capabilities and 
bodies responsible for tackling the issues pertaining to cyber defence from the year of 
1999 to the 2018 Brussels Summit. This will be achieved, in part, by tracing the 
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developments embedded in respective NATO Summit Declarations, which are the highest-
level consensual policy documents that the Alliance subsequently acts on. The article 
identifies the NATO Summits most instrumental to the development of cybersecurity in 
the Alliance, whose impact will likely be lasting for the decades to come. Last but not 
least, it attempts to answer the questions of whether NATO has done enough to boost the 
capabilities of the Allies and to prepare them for the cyber threats of the 21st century or 
whether it is lagging behind and needs to up the ante in order to prepare for the security 
environment it currently faces. Other significant issues, namely NATO’s cooperation with 
the European Union as well as the question of developing offensive capabilities, are 
briefly outlined and discussed. 
Wherever possible, references will mostly consist of primary sources, such as summit 
declarations, strategic concepts, and official communications. Furthermore, based on 
their relevance, articles and analyses found on the websites of NATO and its affiliated 
organisations will be utilized. Last but not least, secondary literature focusing on relevant 
issues will be used. 
CYBER DEFENCE DECISION-MAKING IN NATO 
The process of cyber defence policy preparation in NATO is mostly referred to the Cyber 
Defence Committee, which reports directly to the North Atlantic Council, the main body 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose every decision is understood to 
be an expression of the collective will of all 29 Allies, as its decisions must be taken by 
consensus.8 
At the highest level, the NATO’s stated purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security 
of its members through political and military means. The declared political objectives 
include promotion of democratic values and encouraging consultation and cooperation on 
defence issues to build trust and prevent conflicts. On the military side, despite NATO 
claiming it is being first and foremost committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes, 
should diplomatic efforts fail the Alliance has continually reaffirmed that it retains the 
military capacity needed to undertake crisis management operations, which are carried 
out either under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or under a UN mandate. 
Even though the overall stability and security within the Euro-Atlantic area and in the rest 
of the world is desired, one of the Alliance’s three core tasks (and arguably the most 
important one) is its essential collective defence framework, which since 2014 per the 
Enhanced NATO Cyber Defence Policy also comprises cyber defence. 
The organisational structure within NATO is hierarchical with precisely defined 
responsibilities. The existing structure pertinent to cyber defence was streamlined by the 
aforementioned 2014 Policy. 
As with any important decision, the ultimate oversight and political responsibility lie with 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC). NAC provides the International Staff (IS) and 
International Military Staff (IMS) with high-level oversight on the implementation of the 
                                                 
8 NATO. Undated. What is NATO. Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html. 
NATO. 2018. Cyber Defence. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm. 




policy, exercises authority in cyber-defence related crisis management and receives 
information and provides political guidance on any major cyber incident or attack. 
The key political body subordinate to the NAC is the Cyber Defence Committee (CDC), 
which consists of representatives from the Allied countries and IS and IMS staff. CDC 
provides NAC with proposals and recommendations and develops political guidance and 
cyber defence policy. 
The Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB), which meets on several occasions 
annually, is responsible for the coordination of cyber defence efforts across the Alliance. 
Its scope permeates all relevant NATO bodies, regardless of their nature, be it political, 
technical or military. Stakeholders from the International Staff, International Military 
Staff and respective relevant bodies all get a seat at the table. 
The Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Board provides technical and 
implementation guidance. Similar specific responsibilities lie with the NATO Military 
Authorities (NMAs) and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA). The 
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) based in Norfolk, Virginia, is responsible for the 
continuous adaptation of the Alliance to new challenges. In the cyber defence field, ACT 
is also responsible for the organisation of the annual Cyber Coalition exercise. 
Last but certainly not least, NCIA’s NCIRC centres are at the forefront of securing NATO’s 
cyber defence technically as well as of coordinating efforts both within NATO and with 
other international organizations. A key Cyber Operations Centre is presently being set 
up after being established in August 2018.9 
This robust setup has evolved for almost 20 years along with NATO’s cyber policies, which 
provided the respective bodies with the mandate to conduct their duties. At the very 
beginning of the process, however, NATO had been awfully unprepared for the initial set 
of challenges it was about to face, and – as the following paragraphs will illustrate – most 
of the progress in the area in fact resulted from decisions taken in the past dozen years 
or so. 
TRACKING THE EVOLUTION OF NATO’S POLICY APPROACH TO CYBER DEFENCE 
The 1999 Strategic Concept as a Prelude to a Cyber-Aware NATO 
In spite of the fact that the threat of cyber-attacks is for the first time mentioned 
verbatim in the 2002 Prague Summit Declaration, one could argue that it was in fact the 
year of 1999 that one could view as the key milestone in the first recognition and 
jumpstart of NATO’s approach to cyber defence. Two notable events, which took place 
in April 1999, support this argument. 
The first of these were the cyber-attacks orchestrated by Serbian and Russian hackers 
against NATO systems and networks during the Kosovo War. Later, after the mistaken 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, they were joined by hackers hailing from 
China. These cyber attacks, an oft-forgotten component of the 1999 Kosovo campaign, 
mostly took shape of denial of service type intrusions and website defacements, and on 
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several occasions succeeded in taking down servers and websites operated by NATO and 
the U.S. military.10 
The second, and in this context arguably even more important, development was the 
adoption of the new Strategic Concept first released on 24th April 1999, which notably 
resulted in the Alliance broadening its approach to security threats. Apart from traditional 
military threats, NATO took note of the evolving strategic environment, and redesigned 
its purpose to be able to also respond to new emerging threats and other “non-military 
risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict.”11 
These threats included “serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and 
religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse 
of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional 
instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, 
to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of 
the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in 
other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.” Other explicitly 
mentioned issues included proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, acts 
of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, disruption of the flow of vital resources, 
migration – particularly as consequence of armed conflicts – or the global spread of 
technology that can be of use in the production of weapons. 
The very groundwork for subsequent expansion of NATO’s cyber defence policies and 
capabilities is then laid forward in paragraph 23: “In addition, state and non-state 
adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance’s growing reliance on information systems 
through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to 
use strategies of this kind to counter NATO’s superiority in traditional weaponry.”12 
It is unclear whether this statement was prepared well in advance or put together hastily 
in the light of transpiring events. However, prior to the adoption of the 2010 Strategic 
Concept, it served as the very framework and basis for the development of capabilities 
required to tackle these threats on which the respective Summit Declarations of the 2000s 
have since built upon. 
The need to be able to address emerging threats was cemented by the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the United States, which have further demonstrated that at a time when an 
interstate armed conflict in the trans-Atlantic area seemed rather unlikely in the 
foreseeable future, the so-called emerging threats were to play a key role in security 
matters in the early 21st century. 
The first cyber defence capabilities of NATO countries (such as the U.S. or the United 
Kingdom) were thus developed as a response to cyber-attacks being considered a likely 
component of any future crisis as well as a new requirement to securing the systems, 
networks and services of NATO missions deployed all over the world, including missions 
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aiming to curb the threat of world-wide terrorism.13 The strategic thinking reflected the 
lessons learned from conflicts of the 1990s. 
Baby Steps: Recognition of Cyber Threats, Establishing the NCIRC 
NATO first recognized both the existence of cyber threats and the need to protect its 
networks during the 2002 Prague Summit. One of the decisions made there also included 
establishing the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability, or NCIRC, which is the 
body that provides technical and legislative support services to respond to computer 
security incidents within NATO computer systems and networks.14 Currently based at 
SHAPE,15 Mons, Belgium, NCIRC “protects NATO’s own networks by providing centralised 
and round-the-clock cyber defence support to the various NATO sites.”16 
The impact of the recognition should not be overestimated, as the 2002 Prague Summit 
Declaration mentioned cyber defence only briefly in article 4f, where the decision to 
“[s]trengthen our capabilities to defend against cyber-attacks” was explicitly 
expressed.17 
From today’s perspective, the recognition is to be understood as a reactive decision in 
light of the increasing attacks on Allied networks. As previously mentioned, the first major 
attacks targeting NATO’s networks occurred during the Operation Allied Force in the 
Kosovo war of 1999, when Serbian and Russian hackers reportedly conducted Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in response to the Alliance’s involvement in the conflict. 
Chinese hackers later joined in on the fray, after the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was 
accidentally bombed.18 However, the first cyber espionage case targeting networks of 
U.S. universities and military bases took place in 198619 and computer systems and 
networks in Allied countries were hit by politically motivated hackers as far back as 1989, 
with several more incidents occurring in the 1990s.20 Given the timeframe, NATO was 
significantly lagging behind some of its respective member states in terms of identifying 
new threats. 
The decision to establish the NCIRC would thus seem to be in accordance with the 1999 
Strategic Concept, which for the first time affirmed the Alliance’s commitment to a broad 
approach to security, and probably in response to the attacks on NATO’s networks first 
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15 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. 
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manifested the threat posed by its growing reliance on information systems that could be 
exploited or degraded. A presentation given by Suleyman Anil, then Head of the NCIRC 
Coordination Centre within the NATO Office of Security, on 15th January 2004 in Madrid 
during the 11th TF-CSIRT Meeting however states that in part the development of the 
NCIRC was made possible by the momentum of 9/11.21 This seems to be supported by the 
2002 Prague Summit Declaration, where cyber defence measures could be construed as 
being undertaken in order to ensure the proper functioning of computer networks and 
systems on missions where NATO forces are deployed.22 
Explicit mentions of areas pertaining to the field of cyber defence are present in neither 
of the declarations from the Istanbul Summit of 200423 nor the Heads of State and 
Government meeting in Brussels in 2005.24 These summits mostly revolved around issues 
such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the situation in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and/or the Balkans, etc. In light of the aforementioned issues as well 
as the landmark 2004 NATO enlargement, which again highlighted the capability gaps 
between the Allies (not just amongst the newcomers, but also the longstanding members 
of the Alliance), it is understandable that the already recognized, but not yet fully 
understood field of cyber defence did not receive much attention at all. 
The 2006 Riga Summit’s final communiqué however fleshes out how NATO’s forces must 
continue to adapt, with ‘work to develop a NATO Network Enabled Capability to share 
information, data and intelligence reliably, securely and without delay in Alliance 
operations, while improving protection of our key information systems against cyber-
attack’ being one of the included initiatives.25 Even though Riga put the cyber agenda 
back on the map after a brief lull, cyber defence would likely not take off as much had it 
not been for a game-changing attack on one of the member states.26 
Estonia, Bucharest and Beyond: Ramping Up 
The 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia that accompanied protests against the decision to move 
the statue of the Bronze soldier from the city centre of Tallinn to its outskirts mark 
a drastic shift of development in regards to NATO’s approach to cyber defence.27 While 
the actual effects of the cyber campaign, which mostly consisted of DDoS attacks, in 
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hindsight did not prove to be as sinister as the initial reaction might have suggested,28 the 
events did play a key role in shaping the discourse for years to come. 
In the aftermath of the events in Estonia during the spring of 2007, the first NATO Policy 
on Cyber Defence was defined and approved in January 2008.29 It was this very iteration 
of the Policy, along with the subsequent Bucharest Summit, that laid the actual 
foundation of NATO’s policy approach toward cyber defence, almost ten years after the 
Alliance first bore the brunt of cyber attacks. In spite of the Summit bringing the attention 
to emerging threats in general (including cyber defence), these were only mentioned at 
the end of the Summit Declaration, once again suggesting that the topic was still not 
considered the top Allied priority at the time.30 
The established framework however included first key principles, such as that NATO and 
the Allies should protect their key information systems in accordance with their 
respective responsibilities, share best practices and provide a capability to assist Allied 
nations, upon request, to counter a cyber-attack (in line with the Article IV of the 
Washington treaty).31 
The Alliance also pledged to continue the development of cyber defence capabilities and 
to strengthen the linkages between NATO and national authorities. Requirements for 
NATO systems and recommendation for the Allies were also fleshed out and the Cyber 
Defence Management Authority (later replaced by the Cyber Defence Management Board, 
or CDMB) was created. 
If there was any room left for doubt vis-à-vis the necessity of these measures, the notion 
was quickly dispelled in summer of 2008, as armed forces of the Russian Federation 
invaded Georgia. The footsteps of Russian soldiers onto Georgian soil were accompanied 
by a well-orchestrated campaign of attacks in cyberspace,32 further providing credence 
to the idea that, at the very least, cyber-attacks will be used as a tactical force multiplier 
in virtually every military campaign to come, and that they pose a clear threat to the 
mission and interests of the Alliance. 
There were numerous reasons as to why the Russian leadership opted for the military 
campaign, but one notably stands out – just months prior, in the Bucharest Summit 
Declaration, NATO welcomed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s aspirations for membership in NATO 
with the premise that they could eventually become Allies by making it clear the Alliance 
supports both countries’ application for a Membership Action Plan. 
The Russian response was thus likely premeditated and probably aimed at preventing 
Georgia from joining the Alliance. As the official NATO policy includes the precondition 
that international, ethnic or external territorial disputes are settled by peaceful means 
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30 NATO. 2008. Bucharest Summit Declaration. Available at: https://bit.ly/1km1TEJ  
31 Ibid. 
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prior to a country joining the Alliance,33 Georgia is de facto prevented from gaining 
membership due to the frozen conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the 
fact that both of the territories declared independence from Georgia in the aftermath of 
the war, despite these claims being largely internationally non-recognized. 
In 2009, the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration stressed the commitment to 
strengthening communication and information systems that are of critical importance to 
the Alliance against cyber attacks. Apart from detailing numerous successes (such as NATO 
having adopted the policy, improved the NCIRC, and established the CDMA), the 
Declaration stated that cyber defence was to be made an integral part of NATO exercises, 
the development of cyber defence capabilities was to be further accelerated, and the 
cooperation between NATO and Partner countries and even with international 
organizations (albeit with the caveat of ‘as appropriate’)34 was to be improved. Last, but 
not least, the Declaration celebrated the successful establishment of the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, a think-tank created in Tallinn in the 
wake of the 2007 attacks on Estonia and accredited by NATO. 
The Declaration on Alliance Security, another document that was adopted at the Summit 
in April 2009, inter alia called for a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. 
From Lisbon to Wales: New Concept and Policy 
The 2010 Strategic Concept was developed in the run-up to the 2010 Lisbon Summit, 
where it was adopted along with the Lisbon Summit Declaration. Apart from the general 
realization that cyber defence will likely remain a key security topic for the foreseeable 
future and that future conflicts taking place all around the world are highly likely to 
include a cyber dimension, the two documents clearly reflect on the lessons learned from 
computer network operations observed in Estonia in 2007 and in Georgia in 2008 and push 
for integration and coordination of cyber defence throughout the Alliance. 
The Strategic Concept lists cyber threats as well as potential threat actors – foreign 
militaries and intelligence services, organized criminals, terrorist and extremist groups. 
Cyber defences and resilience – the ability to quickly recover from a cyber-attack – are 
pointed out as priorities. Moreover, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is to be 
used to enhance and coordinate the Allied cyber-defence capabilities. All NATO bodies 
are to be brought under a centralized cyber protection and NATO cyber awareness, 
warning and response with Allied nations to be better integrated.35 
The Lisbon Summit Declaration first mentions the rapid increase in cyber threats and their 
sophistication. It states that NATO’s permanent and unfettered access to cyber space and 
the integrity of its critical systems need be ensured, and the cyber dimension of modern 
conflicts needs to be taken into account by NATO. Furthermore, the resilience of the 
systems and the capabilities of the NCIRC were to be boosted.36 
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The North Atlantic Council was subsequently tasked to develop a new, revised and in-
depth iteration of NATO Cyber Defence Policy by June 2011 and to prepare an action plan 
for its subsequent implementation. The Policy included several important goals: the 
NCIRC was to achieve Full Operational Capability (or FOC) by the end of 2012 and all NATO 
bodies were to be brought under its wings. As part of this measure, the Alliance was to 
set up cyber Rapid Reaction Teams (RRTs) consisting of national or NATO experts that 
could be quickly deployed should a severe attack befall an Ally.37 In turn, the NCIRC 
became part of the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), which overtook 
the responsibility for NATO’s centralised cyber protection.38 
For further development of the Allies’ cyber defence capabilities, to assist the Allies upon 
their request in accordance with the Article IV of the Washington treaty and to optimise 
information sharing and interoperability, in accordance with the Strategic Concept, 
NATO’s defence planning processes were to be followed. NATO also committed itself to 
work closely with other international organizations, such as the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the 
European Union, again with a caveat of ‘as agreed’.39 In this regard, in hindsight, the 
second iteration of the Cyber Defence Policy along with the Cyber Defence Concept and 
Cyber Defence Plan should be seen as aspirational, with limited outcomes at this point in 
time. 
The Chicago Summit held in May 2012 and its Declaration subsequently echoed the 
aforementioned goals that were embedded in the policy and its implementing 
documents.40 
The Wales Summit and the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy 
In February 2014, Allied defence ministers tasked NATO to develop a new iteration of the 
cyber defence policy. The Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence was successfully 
adopted in June 2014. Its implementation is supported by the Cyber Defence Action Plan, 
which contains specific objectives and timelines. Just prior to the implementation, in May 
2014, the NCIRC achieved its slightly delayed full operational capability.41 
By far the most important aspect of the 2014 policy is that the cyber defence has for the 
first time been officially established as part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. 
NATO is held responsible for the protection of its own networks, while the respective 
Allies are responsible for their own communication and information systems and 
networks. The applicability of international law to cyberspace has also been confirmed 
by the Heads of State and Government. 
Other key aspects include streamlined cyber defence governance, establishing of 
procedures for assistance to Allied countries, the integration of cyber defence into 
operational and contingency planning, and improvements to awareness, education, 
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training and exercises activities. The Allies further committed themselves to enhance 
mutual information sharing and assistance. 
The development of capabilities will be facilitated by an Alliance-wide approach via the 
NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Cyber defence capabilities and their 
development were also integrated into NATO’s Smart Defence initiative. Specific projects 
included the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) project, the Smart Defence 
Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MN CD2) project, and the 
Multinational Cyber Defence Education and Training (MN E&T) project. 
Moreover, an initiative to boost cooperation with industry and academia on cyber threats 
and challenges was launched in accordance with the new policy in September 2014. The 
NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP) framework was endorsed at the Wales Summit 
and later presented at an industry conference held in Mons, Belgium.42 
The Wales Summit Declaration from September 2014 built upon the Enhanced NATO Cyber 
Defence Policy, reaffirming the need for the Allies to strengthen the cyber security of 
their national networks upon which NATO depends for its core tasks and for the entire 
Alliance to further develop both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Relevant partner 
nations as well as other international organisations are to be engaged on a case-by-case 
basis, with the European Union explicitly named as an example, again with the caveat of 
‘as agreed’. The development of a NATO cyber range, which was to be built on the 
existing Estonian cyber range capability, was another notable decision of the Wales 
Summit.43 
A two-day May 2015 meeting in Antalya, Turkey marked an official NATO-EU agreement 
on the cooperation in countering hybrid warfare, which also includes cyber threats. This 
was an important step, since until then the NATO-EU cooperation in cyber security mostly 
consisted of high-level staff-to-staff consultations that took place annually since 2010. 
Prior to that, initial cooperation in the field was only facilitated by informal ad hoc staff-
to-staff talks, in which relevant bodies from each organisation participated.44 
The Way Forward: The Warsaw Summit and the Adoption of Offensive Capabilities in 
Brussels 
As the Alliance moved toward the Warsaw Summit, it had to cope with a new set of 
challenges that put cyber defence at the forefront. The two greatest were the resurgence 
of aggressive Russia in Ukraine as well as the spread of the so-called Islamic State in Syria 
and Iraq, including its various cells and offshoots in Europe and elsewhere. 
Warsaw was thus expected to further build on the foundation laid by the 2014 Enhanced 
NATO Cyber Defence Policy and the Cyber Defence Action Plan, which were at that point 
still being implemented. However, the end-result that manifested in two important 
declarations exceeded expectations. 
While the Allies reaffirmed NATO’s defensive mandate and the intent to continue to 
follow the principle of restraint, steering clear of expanding the mandate to include 
offensive operations, the Warsaw Summit Declaration recognises “cyberspace as a domain 
of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on 
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land and at sea.” With the rationale being that as most crises and conflicts have and will 
continue to have a cyber dimension or element, the intent of treating cyberspace as 
a domain should result in enabling NATO to better protect and conduct its missions and 
operations.45 
In its essence, the decision has raised the priority of cyber defence by equalizing it with 
the other three domains, enabled NATO to tackle the challenges at an operational level 
and broadened the range of potential responses to cyber attacks. 
The second important outcome produced at the Warsaw Summit was the Cyber Defence 
Pledge, a declaration made at the highest political level of Heads of State and 
Government that recognizes new realities of the trans-Atlantic security environment and 
pledges that the Allies will enhance their cyber security by developing “the fullest range 
of capabilities” as a matter of priority, reinforce resilience and defences in the Euro-
Atlantic region and continue working on improving international cooperation and 
facilitating cooperation through multinational projects. In terms of enhancing national 
cyber defence capabilities, the Pledge ranks among the most important agreed documents 
to date, as it required attention and decision-making at the highest levels. 
To ensure that the Cyber Defence Pledge does not end up a mere empty declaration, the 
Allies stressed that progress would be tracked by an annual assessment based on agreed 
metrics and reviewed at the next summit.46 The metrics probably would have been 
developed by 2017, their setup and manner of reporting will in all likelihood be 
instrumental to either the success or the downfall of the Pledge. 
The Cyber Defence Pledge reasserts NATO’s ongoing adaptation to the threat 
environment, a realization that, in cyber defence, the Alliance is only as strong as its 
weakest member, and a long-term shift to building resilience. Apart from other benefits 
including a more stable infrastructure and less downtime in case of an event or incident 
taking place, in a field where traditional deterrence models in many cases are no longer 
adequate, resilience can also “work as a form of post-even deterrence-by-denial, which, 
if successful, may reduce adversaries’ cost-benefit analyses.” Such a framework accepts 
“that cyberattacks will happen, recognizing that this is not necessarily a ‘deterrence 
failure’ but may represent an opportunity to learn and adapt.”47 
Furthermore, in February 2017, Allied defence ministers approved an updated Cyber 
Defence Action Plan along with a roadmap to implement cyberspace as a domain of 
operations, and, in June of the same year, they also agreed to a new set of cyber defence 
capability targets.48 
The years 2016 and 2017 also set new milestones in terms of NATO-EU cyber defence 
cooperation. Even prior to the Warsaw Summit, in February 2016, NATO and the EU agreed 
on a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence, which set up a framework that allows the 
NCIRC and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the EU (CERT-EU) to exchange 
information and share best practices to prevent and respond to cyber attacks.49 
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In summer, the agreed Warsaw Summit Declaration further reasserted the intent to 
cooperate with the EU (albeit again with the caveat of “as agreed”). Apart from 
cooperation at the technical and tactical levels, the key form of cooperation consists of 
information sharing. For instance, during the 2017 WannaCry and NotPetya campaigns, 
NATO shared information about the threats with the EU, nations and private companies 
in real time.50 While threat intelligence and information sharing are both vital in 
coordinating responses and tackling cyber threats, this information exchange was not 
always feasible, as the confidential nature and limited releasability of intelligence in both 
organizations that consist of different member states often prevents full disclosure. 
Moreover, in December 2016, NATO and EU agreed on a package of over 40 measures 
aimed at managing hybrid threats, which again included cyber defence. 
These decisions would further build upon the outcomes of the Warsaw Summit. However, 
for the time being the cooperation is likely to remain limited to the tactical or in rare 
cases operational levels. Firstly, it is because the two organizations focus on different 
agendas, with NATO focusing predominantly on capacity building and preparedness in 
cyber defence while the EU zooms in on regulation and cyber security best practices 
(through mechanisms such as the NIS Directive). Secondly, in terms of institutional, policy 
and organisational preparedness, NATO is ahead of the EU, which only adopted its first 
cyber defence policy framework in late 201451 and which cannot compare to NATO in 
terms of institutional and organisational build-up, where NATO had a notable head start. 
Finally, while both organisations can each step in to help the other out, the Allies (and 
especially the non-EU Member States among them) will be wary of any potential 
duplication taking place. 
The 2018 Brussels Summit and the Future: On the Offensive? 
Despite not making for the most visible highlights, cyber defence was featured very 
prominently on the agenda during the Brussels Summit. 
The 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration has references to cyber defence littered throughout 
the document. In an output in which every last comma is carefully weighed, discussed 
and argued over, it highlights both the importance the Alliance currently ascribes to cyber 
defence as well as the development the agenda has undergone in the past twenty years. 
By far the most impactful decision that the Allies agreed on and had embedded in the 
Declaration are the continued efforts to implement cyberspace as a domain of NATO 
operations and missions. For the first time ever, the Alliance took the decision to employ 
the full range of cyber capabilities, including “sovereign cyber effects, provided 
voluntarily by Allies, into Alliance operations and missions, in the framework of strong 
political oversight.”52 This is in stark contrast to the previous assertions, in which NATO 
continually reaffirmed its strictly defensive posture for cyber operations. 
Moreover, the 20th paragraph of the Declaration stressed the need for bolstering 
intelligence-led situational awareness for decision-making, encouraged the respective 
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Allies to attribute cyber attacks when appropriate, and reasserted NATO’s previous 
commitments of Cyber Defence Pledge and the applicability of international humanitarian 
law and human rights law (with a caveat) to cyberspace. NATO, furthermore, committed 
to supporting peace, promoting stability and working with the industry and academia.53 
The decision to potentially go on the cyber offensive taken at the summit is a major 
development in the overall picture of the Alliance. Despite being somewhat overshadowed 
by the antics of the U.S. president Trump as well as his demands for the Allies to ramp 
up their defence spending to at least 2% of their national GDP,54 in essence the Alliance 
has redefined its strategic cyber defence posture to also include an offensive component. 
NATO has thus clearly re-evaluated its previous position, and the Alliance has embarked 
on a gradual shift towards a more proactive and offensive posture, which will allow it to 
utilize a wider range of potential responses to being targeted. 
In order for the decision to be implemented, in August 2017 NATO established, and is 
currently in the process of setting up, a Cyber Operations Center, or CyOC, in Mons, 
Belgium. The command centre is to be fully staffed and operational by 2023. Even though 
ground rules are still being pondered over and the current policy may yet change, 
currently the likely vision of the centre is to serve as a conduit for the coordination of 
national contributions to NATO operations and missions, as the Allies have decided to only 
provide voluntary effects, not capabilities per se. These could be likened to hacking-as-
a-service. At full strength, the centre aims to staff a 70-strong team of experts. The CyOC 
will also closely cooperate with existing bodies that protect NATO, namely the NATO 
Communications & Information Agency and the NATO Cyber Incident Response Capability 
technical centre.55 
The utilization of the offensive element and the setting up of the CyOC also suggest the 
likely cyber agenda for NATO for the years ahead. Apart from efforts to strengthen 
national defences through continued implementation of the Cyber Defence Pledge, 
challenges that the Allies will have to face together in the near- and medium-term will 
probably include fleshing out mechanisms to attribute attacks and coordinate national 
contributions to operations and missions. While a push by some European Allies for greater 
cooperation with the European Union and possibly other international organisations is 
considered possible, greater progress is probably unlikely, as the immediate concerns and 
priorities of the respective organisations are somewhat disparate, with the notable 
exception of the NATO-EU threat environment, which may provide potential for greater 
information-sharing and cooperation at the tactical and operational levels. 
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The cyber defence approach of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization stems from the 
organisation’s aims and overall needs rooted in its three core tasks of collective defence, 
crisis management and cooperative security. After all, NATO’s main purpose is to ensure 
security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. The successes and limits alike are largely 
based on the fact that NATO is an intergovernmental organization with a consensus-based 
decision-making. As per its 2014 Enhanced NATO Cyber Defence Policy, cyber defence is 
understood as part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. 
The evolution of NATO’s approach to cyber defence dates at least as far back as 2002, 
however, the importance of the field seems not to have been fully grasped until Estonia 
became victim to a series of cyber attacks in 2007. 
The first iteration of NATO’s cyber defence policy along with the Bucharest Summit 
Declaration have subsequently laid the foundation to tackle the emerging cyber threats. 
As the evolution continued further, more improvements were made possible by the Lisbon 
Summit Declaration, the 2010 Strategic Concept and most importantly the revised 2011 
Enhanced NATO Cyber Policy, which was later reaffirmed by the 2012 Chicago Summit. In 
hindsight, at this point, the policies and measures taken could still be seen as aspirational 
and limited, i.e. cybersecurity still lingered in a state of void in terms of technologies, 
institutional and policy preparedness, as well as legal background. 
15 years of Allied efforts culminated in 2014, when the new Enhanced NATO Cyber 
Defence Policy broadened NATO’s mandate and the Heads of State and Government 
publicly recognized at the Wales Summit that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task 
of collective defence. Together with the recognition of applicability of international law 
to cyberspace, these two Wales Summit decisions might very well be the most important 
of all those taken within the agenda in terms of their impact, as they could directly result 
in the invocation of Article V in a severe cyber-enabled crisis. These decisions and the 
realization of their implications will continue to bolster the Alliance’s resilience and 
preparedness in light of the contemporary cyber threat landscape. Furthermore, the 
establishment of NATO Industry Cyber Partnership has increased NATO’s potential to 
cooperate with the private sector and obtain innovative technologies. 
The recognition of cyberspace as a domain that was agreed at the Warsaw Summit in 
summer of 2016 provided the Alliance with more manoeuvrability required to conduct 
defensive cyber operations. On the national level, the Cyber Defence Pledge also adopted 
in Warsaw by the top decision-makers – the Heads of State and Government – could 
provide a remarkable instrument, provided that the Allies have come up with granular, 
verifiable metrics that will serve to establish a baseline and track progress, and that they 
will consciously decide for and uphold an allocation of substantial funds for necessary 
investments over a long-term period. 
In terms of NATO’s cyber defence posture, the 2018 Brussels Summit was then nothing 
short of revolutionary, as the Alliance took the decisive step that would allow it to 
conduct offensive cyber operations based on voluntary cyber effects supplied by the 
respective Allies. The CyOC that is being established will take years to achieve full 
operational capability, and prior to that it is likely that the Allies will continue their 
efforts to specifically flesh out the mechanisms as to how exactly national contributions 
and Allied efforts will be coordinated and how operations are to be undertaken. The 




Alliance will also need to tackle the difficult task of fleshing out and agreeing on the 
attribution process. 
Indeed, the three summits of 2014, 2016 and 2018 will in hindsight probably be considered 
as instrumental in cementing both the Alliance’s cyber defence policy and posture as well 
as forging a mechanism for the Allies to further invest in developing national capabilities. 
Despite continually reaffirming its adherence to the principle of restraint and norms of 
responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, throughout its declarations NATO stresses that 
it only observes the process of establishing these norms. The apparent reluctance likely 
stems from a self-awareness that it would not bode well for a political-military alliance 
to be the vehicle of Western interests in the process, and that the United Nations and 
OSCE are a more suitable arena for shaping the discussion. 
In terms of capabilities and capacity building, NATO’s key decisions and successes were 
the establishment of NATO Computer Incident Response Capability in 2002 and its further 
development to full operational capability achieved in May 2014, the establishment of 
NATO Communications and Information Agency, the decision to establish the Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, in the wake of the 2007 cyber 
attacks on the country, the development of Rapid Reaction Teams for the field of cyber 
defence or the recent decision to establish a cyber defence range based on the existing 
Estonian capability. The most important decision going forward has been to set up the 
proposed Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC) in Belgium by 2023. 
In terms of actionability, NATO has undertaken significant endeavour in terms of trying 
to approach the issue of cyber defence in a more proactive fashion, despite being 
somewhat constrained by the need to reach consensus on every decision taken. This is in 
stark contrast with the slow and reactive beginnings twenty years ago. 
From an outside view, the first steps in the aftermath of the Operation Allied Force 
yielded no tangible results. Likely due to NATO’s inability to prioritize the security of 
Allied computer systems and networks and to make them a point of focus prior to the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, the agenda was overshadowed by more pressing matters of the 
early 2000s, such as the war against terror or the massive NATO enlargement of 2004. 
However, even though the Alliance first adopted proper policies only in the wake of the 
2007 attacks on Estonia, it has since come a long way in laying the necessary groundwork 
to face its looming challenges. In the past 10 years, much progress has been made on both 
the policy and institutional preparedness fronts. 
It no longer holds true that NATO is inadequately prepared for cyber crises of today. The 
compounding effect of the 2014-2018 summits may well translate to a significant rise in 
Allied levels of preparedness. NATO currently seems well positioned to provide guidance 
and lead its Member States in developing the capabilities required to tackle the threats 
that are bound to come. However, the Alliance must now focus on the actual 
implementation of all the agreed-upon policies, frameworks and procedures the Allies 
have developed together. 
In terms of NATO doing enough to boost the capabilities of the Allies and prepare them 
for threats emerging from the cyberspace, one could argue that it has successfully 
promoted best practices and pushed the respective member states to increase their 
awareness, spending and capacity-building in the area. Given that the Alliance retains 
a consensus-based decision-making, its progress in the cybersecurity agenda has been 




substantial in the past five years. The future outcome will, however, be decided by 
actions on part of each Ally, under the guiding principle of the Allied chain being as strong 
as its weakest link. 
Notable challenges will continue to lie in the safety and resilience of interconnected 
systems, vastly different levels of preparedness of the respective Allies as well as 
disparate commitments to adhering to the Cyber Defence Pledge and spending on the 
national level, and the eventual implementation of full-scale computer network 
operations into the ever-broadening portfolio of tools at the disposal of Allied Command 
Operations. 
 
